Abstract: Both within and across countries, most attention has been devoted to measuring inequality among individuals (and globally countries). Within countries, increasing evidence shows that inequalities among groups (HIs) are important for wellbeing. However, the global component of HIs are generally neglected. The paper argues that HIs at a global level may also be important for world stability and wellbeing, in much the same way HIs are relevant at the national level. With this perspective, the paper reviews Muslim/ non-Muslim HIs within developed and developing countries, and between Muslim and non-Muslim countries, finding that Muslims are systematically disadvantaged across many dimensions. It argues that, despite much heterogeneity among the Muslim population, there is evidence of multiple global connections and of shared perceptions, such that inequalities faced by Muslims in one part of the world may become a source of grievance and potential mobilisation in other parts of the world. Consequently, socio-economic and political inequalities need to be addressed globally, within countries and between them, and politically as well as with respect to socio-economic and cultural status.
Introduction
Both within and across countries, most attention has been devoted to measuring inequality among individuals (and globally countries). Within countries, increasing evidence shows that inequalities among groups (HIs) are important for wellbeing, effective policies towards poverty and for political stability, and a set of policies to correct such HIs are being identified (Stewart, 2008) . However, apart from measurement of inter-country inequality and North-South inequalities, the global component of HIs is generally neglected. 4 This paper argues that HIs at a global level are also important for world stability and wellbeing, in much the same way as at the national level. Like national level analysis, the inequalities in question are not only socio-economic in nature, but also political and cultural. The groups to be explored are identity groups -i.e. groups with which "members" have strong affiliation. The most obvious and formally organised groups of this kind are national ones (i.e. countries), but here I am primarily concerned not with national identity groups but with religious and ethnic identity groups, whose members cross national boundaries.
This boundary crossing may stimulate global resentments and even violence, may lead to global flows of support for (and against) the extended group (including finance, arms, propaganda, political manoeuvring) and consequently requires global as well as national solutions.
Identities are fluid and change over time, so that the salient identities which have global significance also change. Historically, the Jews, the Lebanese and the Chinese have each formed global groups with a shared identity across countries -though the strength of members" affiliation has clearly varied between individuals and over time.
Christians -particularly Catholics with their common papal hierarchy -have formed another global identity (whose unity has varied over time), also with global implications as illustrated, for example, by the Crusades and the world wide activities of Missionaries. The first type, diasporic ethnic or nationalistic identities, have clear attachments to a particular place; while it is the common set of beliefs, and sometimes organisational hierarchies, that bind religious identities. Each of these groups remain of significance today, but probably the most dominant contemporary global identity group is that of Muslims, and I shall illustrate my argument with information on this group.
Muslims taken as a whole do not have an organisational hierarchy to unite them, but they have a strong theological basis for global identity, in the form of the Ummah, or the indivisible community of the faithful. "The idea of the Ummah … is not a materialised homeland that one may look up on a map. Rather we are dealing with a mythological homeland that is both nowhere and everywhere offering membership across national boundaries." (Schmidt, 2004: 41 ). Yet it is essential to acknowledge that Muslims are not homogeneous: besides many other differences, there are sharp divisions, often leading to violent conflict, between Shiites and Sunnis; in addition, there are differences between liberals and radicals, in history, economic activity, education, nationality, language. As Sivan notes, "the movement as a whole...is made up of a plethora of groups, more or less structured, loosely coordinated…often overlapping" (Sivan: 2003: 25) . A big question, then, in relation to the approach adopted here, is whether there is nonetheless sufficient unity, or shared identity, to make the discussion of Muslims as a single, albeit non-homogeneous, group, meaningful. Some evidence on this will be presented in the course of the discussion.
To develop this argument the paper is organised as follows. First, I define HIs and illustrate their role in the national arena, emphasising the multidimensionality of HIs.
A similar analysis applies to the global stage, through ethnic diasporas and common religious identities. Secondly, I illustrate the presence of such inequalities with an overview of broadly contemporary data on Muslims. Thirdly, I provide some evidence on the international links across Muslim groups, whereby grievance in one place can be felt elsewhere. This shared identity is confirmed by evidence from some perceptions surveys that I summarise in section 5. Finally, I conclude that since the inequalities (and resultant mobilisation) present themselves both within and across countries, policies to address them need to be correspondingly multilayered, as well as being multidimensional.
How, why and when Horizontal Inequalities raise the risk of conflict within
countries.
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Horizontal inequality is inequality between groups, as distinct from vertical inequality, or inequality among individuals. These groups are generally culturally defined -by ethnicity, religion, race or region, for example. Horizontal inequalities (HIs) are important because they affect individual well-being, economic efficiency and social stability, while in some circumstances they can lead to serious violent conflict, thereby undermining most development efforts (Langer 2005; Mancini 2008; Østby 2003; Stewart 2002; .
Horizontal inequalities are conceived of as multidimensional, with economic, social and political dimensions. Each dimension encompasses a number of elements. For example, economic inequalities include inequality in access to or ownership of a variety of assets (financial, natural resources, human and social capital) as well as opportunities for their use (especially employment), and the current resources that flow from these assets (i.e. income); social HIs include access to a variety of services (education, health services, housing) and also outcomes in the form of human indicators (infant and maternal mortality, for example, life expectancy, literacy), while political HIs consist in the group distribution of political opportunities including who controls the Presidency, the cabinet, parliamentary assemblies, the bureaucracy, the army, the police, regional and local government; inequalities in cultural status, include inequalities as to how the practices and beliefs of different groups are treated -e.g. recognition and treatment of language, religious practices, dress and behaviour.
Each of these lists includes both inputs and outputs (e.g. assets and incomes; health services and health outcomes), while some dimensions of HIs influence other dimensions (e.g. political power affects the economic and social dimensions; language use affects access to jobs and incomes). This extensive approach is deliberate because (a) many of the elements are not only inputs but also contribute directly to individual wellbeing, and (b) inputs are generally easier to affect directly through policy than outcomes. While the broad dimensions are relevant in any context, the actual elements that matter will vary according to the economy and society -for example, land is less important in industrialised countries than in many developing countries.
Horizontal inequalities are important because they affect well-being directly and because they affect other objectives instrumentally. People's well-being is affected not only by their individual circumstances, but also by how well their group is doing. This is partly because membership of the group is an aspect of a person's identity and hence the group"s situation is felt as part of an individual"s situation; and partly because relative impoverishment of the group increases perceptions of members that they are likely to be trapped permanently in a poor position, or, if they have managed to do better than many in the group, that they are likely to fall back into poverty. (Brown and others 1999) . As a former member of the Guatemalan guerrillas stated "poverty is bad enough, but when you are being discriminated, this strips away your dignity, it is much worse, you feel humiliated, you feel useless, a great quantity of emotions come to you".
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The direct impact on well-being is not only more powerfully felt, but is also a more important consideration, because HIs often persist over generations -showing more persistence, typically, than individuals" ranking within a group (Tilly 1998; Stewart and Langer 2008) .
Horizontal inequalities also matter for three instrumental reasons. First, it may not be possible to improve the position of individuals without tackling the position of the group as a whole. For example, programmes to advance credit to poor producers, or to promote universal education, may not be achievable so long as group inequality remains. Secondly, correcting such horizontal inequalities should have a positive effect on efficiency. Any situation in which a group is discriminated against is likely to be less efficient than in the absence of discrimination, since talented people in the group discriminated against will be held back, while too many resources, or too high a position, will go to less talented people in the favoured group.
The third and most critical instrumental reason for trying to moderate HIs inequalityand the one that concerns us most here -is that group inequality can be a source of poltical mobilisation, sometimes leading to violent conflict (Stewart 2000) . Group inequality provides powerful grievances which leaders can use to mobilise people to political protest, by calling on cultural markers (a common history or language or religion) and pointing to group exploitation. This type of mobilisation appears especially likely to occur where there is political as well as economic inequality, so that the group leaders are excluded from formal political power while the mass of Africa) are estimated to account for perhaps 4 million people, or around 6% of the total population. The Muslim population is concentrated in low-income housing around the major cities, and there is evidence of discrimination in housing allocations (Simon, 1998) . Educational attainments are worse for the Muslim population than the native population, with more repeat years, higher dropout rates, lower attainments in examinations, less attendance at high school and fewer diplomas. According to a report on Muslims in the EU, French Muslims have higher unemployment than native
French and more difficulties in finding long-term fulltime employment (Viprey 2002) .
A study by the University of Paris sending out CVs in response to an advertisement for a salesman found that person from north Africa had five times less chance of getting a positive reply (EUMC).
Cultural inequalities.
Like the Netherlands, all national holidays are Christian or national. But in the public sector leave of absence may be granted to attend the three major festivals. However, the issue of the headscarf has created periodic controversy with schools expelling children for wearing them. The current compromise is that conspicuous religious symbols are not allowed -which de facto is discriminatory to the extent that the headscarf is increasingly regarded as an essential element of being In more detail, the Equality Commission Review reports on socio-economic inequalities:
11 Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2006a.
12 Equalities Commission, 2007.
With respect to employment, the net earnings of Bangladeshi males were reported as just half those of white males (p 25; Interim Report); Pakistanis and Bangladeshis faced "no serious employment penalty compared to Whites in the 1970s, but by the mid 1990s their employment penalty had risen to 13% 13 "; and this was greater for women (24 to 35%) (p 54; Interim Report);
Deprivation is evident in education at every level of education. For example, Pakistani and Bangladeshi rates of attainments in language and literacy at an early age were 57% of those of whites; their home learning environments were reported as worse than whites for each of three economic status groups; their achievement of 5-GSEs was three quarters of that of whites for boys and a bit higher for girls; and they were underrepresented in higher education.
However, there is evidence of some catch-up in recent years (Hills, Sefton and
Stewart 2009).
With respect to health, Bangladeshis reported "not good" health at a rate of 1.74 times that of all England and Wales, and Pakistanis at a rate of 1.81.
(Equality Commission Review: 75). The IMR of Pakistanis has been reported to be 8.6 compared with an overall rate of 4.9. 14 Bangladeshis and Pakistanis with heart diseases are less likely to have undergone bypass or angioplastry procedures than the population on average.
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On political HIs,
In 2005, less than 2.3% of members of parliament were from ethnic minority groups (who account altogether for about 10% of the population); and ethnic minorities accounted for less than 4% of local councillors (Equality Commission: 98).
Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in Britain are ten times more likely to be victims of crime than Whites; 5% of prisoners are Asian (compared with a share of the total population of just over 3%); and rates of police stop and search are higher for all ethnic minority groups than for whites.
16 13 The employment penalty is the difference in percentage employment in relation to population of working age between a particular group and that of whites, the most advantaged group. Muslims in Britain also frequently confront prejudice in their daily lives.
I"m getting bullied at school. People in the neighbourhood are calling my family "terrorists" and say, "Go back to your own country." I"m worried they"ll start saying these things at school. Muslim boys are getting beaten up at school.
-Fatima (aged 9) (From Equalities Commission ).
A survey conducted by the Equalities Commission found that 35% of a random sample of the British population surveyed sometimes feel prejudiced. And nearly half reported that media coverage of Muslims was mainly negative.
The Pew Global Attitudes survey found rather similar attitudes towards Muslims, with 63% of the population reporting a generally favourable view in 2006 and 71% of British Muslims having a generally favourable view of British Christians. But nonetheless, nearly half of non-Muslims thought Muslims were fanatical and one third thought they were violent; however, over half of non-Muslims in Britain thought British Muslims were devout and honest. Turning to Muslim views of non-Muslims, over half British Muslims thought Westerners were violent, 63% felt they were greedy, 57% that they were immoral and 44% that they were fanatical. But over half thought they were generous and 48% thought they were tolerant (Pew Global Attitudes, 2006b it comes to trade and business, the situation is reversed with respect to the Malays/Chinese, although the Indians remain the group with much the largest proportion believing there is domination. These perceptions broadly reflect the reality. In the case of Malaysia, because of the strong overlap between "racial" and religious differences, it is difficult to differentiate between attitudes about these two types of identity. In fact, answers to the question of whether their own group was favoured or discriminated against by the government got very similar answers whether one classified the group by race or by religion.
have diversified their socio-economic roles in the post-colonial era, this significant stratification of the community has endured. Overall, the Indian community remains significantly richer than the Bumiputera, but there remains an underclass of poorer Indians. Maluku, and Central Sulawesi (which also involved ethnic differences). In both these countries, as pointed out by Brown (2008) , the Muslim populations are doubly disadvantaged: first, the regions in which they are located have lower per capita incomes (and growth rates) than the rest of the country; and secondly within the region of concentration, the Muslim population does less well than the rest of the population.
In the Philippines, Mindanao as a whole has been consistently below the national average in terms of GDP per capita, and particularly below Luzon ( Figure Three household assets was 1.17 (Brown, 2008: 273) . Brown (2008: 268) , from HDN and UNDP (2002) In Thailand, the Southern region where the Muslim population is concentrated also shows worse economic performance than the rest of the country ( Figure Four This section provides evidence on two types of international inequality: that between Muslim countries as a group and all others; and that between Israel and Palestine.
Each of these divisions appear potentially to generate shared grievances and consequent incentives for mobilisation.
a. All Muslim countries compared with non-Muslim
Both categories of country are obviously very heterogeneous, in terms of HDI ranging from Norway to Burundi in the non-Muslim category and United Arab Emirates to Guinea Bissau among the majority Muslim states. Average per capita incomes of the states where a majority of the population is Muslim are just 44% of those of the nonMuslim countries, and under five mortality rates are almost twice as high (Table 6 ).
There is great heterogeneity in each group, shown by a high standard deviation.
However, the proportion of countries in the high-HD category is much lower for Muslim countries and the proportion in the low-HD category much higher than for non-Muslim (see Figure Six) .
There is also a clear imbalance in political power. As indicators of this, Table 6 shows how much greater non-Muslim countries" power is by comparing membership of the Security Council, voting rights at the IMF, and military expenditure. By each measure, the Muslim countries fall well below the non-Muslim, including when calculating these in relation to population shares, or numbers of countries. 
b. Israel/Palestine
The large inequalities between Israel and Palestine are well known. 26 Table 7 provides some indicators of socio-economic HIs. There are also, evidently, political HIs, since
Palestine is not internationally recognised as an independent state (and indeed, even if it were, lacks power).
26 There are also inequalities between Jews and Muslims within Israel -for example, the infant mortality rate among Moslems is double that among Jews. "Arabs in Israel are a heterogeneous but largely underprivileged minority with a history of disadvantage in several domains, including education and employment." Okun and Friedlander, 2005: 163. 
Global connections
There is a vast mass of evidence of global connections among different Islamic communities. The direction of some of the major connections are illustrated in Figure   Six (Sivan, 2003: 29) .
6. The media and internet. Media connections occur via global TV channels, such as Al Jazeera and Abu Dhabi TV, radio channels (Radio Islam) and numerous websites and disapora newspapers. The importance of the internet, here as elsewhere, is 33 McKenna 1998. 34 Fuller (1996); Lloyd (2006) . 35 Website of the OIC: http://www.oic-oci.org/oicnew/page_detail.asp?p_id=52
growing. Schmidt (2004) discusses its importance in developing Muslim identities among the young in three Western countries. He notes that "the internet can be an effective tool (besides travelling, mobile phones) in the establishment of a transnational Islamic discourse -"a reimagined umma(h)"" (Schmidt, 2004: 36) .
Discussing the protests against the Danish cartoons, Faisal Devji (2006) Guantanamo Bay (Abbas , 2007) . Abbas attributes his radicalism to "exclusion, marginalisation, disempowerment, media bias, political rhetoric, far right hostility, perceptions in relation to British and US foreign policy, a lack of appropriate Muslim leadership in Britain and a regressive interpretation of Islam as a reactive rather than a pro-active experience" (Abbas, 2007: 430) .
Figure 7
Inspired by a film, The Message, and facing racism in Birmingham, Moazzam began to look to Islam "to get rid of the cultural baggage" (Abbas:432) . He met Bosnian
Muslims, blond and blue-eyed and "felt a great affinity towards them" (433). In the 1990s he made eight or nine trips to Bosnia, and made financial donations to the Bosnian army. After his bookshop was raided by MI5, and he married a Pakistani woman (through an arranged marriage) he moved to Afghanistan and financed and built a school, shortly before 9/11. When asked about the London bombings, he felt "The targeting of individual is wrong and it shouldn"t happen…The overriding factor of the occupation in Iraq and Afghanistan was enough to spur them on to do what they did…it was this idea that it is all one and the same: the struggle in Afghanistan and
Iraq and even Britain, that it"s all connected." (Abbas, 2007: 436 A further indication of a common Muslim identity is the high proportion of Muslimsboth in European countries and in Muslim countries -who said they were Muslims first and citizens of a particular nation second (Figure 9 ). This was true of over half the respondents in 9 of the 16 countries. The CRISE perceptions surveys (cited earlier) adds to this for the four countries with Muslim populations. First, religion was a more important identity for Muslims than for people from other religions in each of the four countries (see Figure Ten) .
Secondly, in all countries the proportion putting this as among there top three identities was considerably greater than those putting nationality in the top three, and in all but Indonesia it was greater for Muslims than for non-Muslims. In Indonesia, though Muslims thought religion was much more important than non-Muslims, nonMuslims also thought national identities were unimportant and ethnicity came out at the strongest identity. identities. When and why this happens is, of course, a critical issue. Important determinants include the extent to which each national group faces similar discrimination and inequality, the strength of connections across national groups, how far there appear to be global attacks on the common identity, and the nature of leadership, among other factors. Moreover, as with national HIs, it is never the case that the entire group is mobilised, but rather that a powerful minority is. As noted in the previous section, the vast majority of Muslims view the rise of Islamic extremism with alarm. Yet, as at the national level, systematic HIs do make mobilisation more likely.
If I am right in arguing that these global HIs raise the risk of conflict, just as national ones do, then strong policy implications follows. As with national HIs it becomes important to reduce HIs in each dimension where they are severe. But the requirements in the global case are much greater than in the national case, since reduction in HIs is needed both within and between countries. Thus the analysis suggests that inequalities within Western societies are one factor raising the risk of global mobilisation, so that quite apart from the need to reduce inequalities in order to build a just and flourishing society, action needs to be taken within each country to reduce socio-economic, political and cultural status HIs to bring about global political stability. Yet this has not been a significant plank of post 9-11 or 7/7 policy, rather suppression has been the main policy. The same is true of the many inequalities observed within developing countries, which are particularly provocative where there are political as well as socio-economic inequalities, as in many of the cases described earlier.
Policies designed to reduce national inequalities in socio-economic, political and cultural status dimensions are fairly well developed (Stewart, 2008) . They have been adopted (with varying degrees of success) in a number of multiethnic or multireligious societies, although rarely with respect to Muslim groups. Yet few policies have been adopted in developed countries beyond anti-discriminatory laws.
The policy requirements also include reducing international inequalities -the most notable because the most visible is that between Israel and Palestine. Again in relation to this situation, force rather than equalisation has been the main policy stance. But in addition, there is a gross imbalance in political power at the global level (including between Palestine and Israel). While power is not something that can be painlessly redistributed as it arises from the intrinsic situation of the parties, some of the symptoms could be alleviated. Most obvious is the systematic use of military power by the West against Muslim nations which powerfully demonstrates the asymmetry of power. In addition, representatives of Muslim states could be incorporated to a much greater extent than at present, and more systematically, into global decision-makingfor example, into the Security Council, the decision-making of the IMF and World Bank, and into ad hoc decision-making bodies. But to do this effectively will require including genuine representatives of the various strands of Muslim thinking, and not simply token people with a Western perspective.
The OIC could be a source of greater empowerment -this would require greater recognition from the rest of the world, and also regular meetings, recommendations and action by the OIC itself. As for national empowerment of particular groups, success is likely to require organisation and claims by the groups themselves, and also recognition and respect by the rest of the world. This is a matter not just (or even necessarily at all) of changing formal rules, but also of changing informal norms and behaviour.
